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Abstract
Up until the recent crisis, the Southeast Asian region had been regarded as one of the
most dynamic regions in the global economy. Their industrial structures have undergone
a process of adjustment into more capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated
manufacturing sectors. These adjustments created intra-regional flows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) followed by the expansion of capital and intermediate goods intra-
firm and intra-industry trade among regional economies. The paper argues that
globalization and openness are not entirely responsible for the recent Asian crisis. It can
be argued, however, that financial and capital-account liberalization was too rapid
because domestic institutional capacities were inadequate and unable to cope with the
influx of capital. …/…
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JEL classification: G29, O11, O16, O53.The broader issues raised by the experience of Southeast Asia pertain to lessons for
other countries, and this in turn centres on the fundamental question: has globalization
and liberalization gone too far?1
Introduction
Up until the recent crisis, the Southeast Asian region had been regarded as one of the
most dynamic regions in the global economy. The region comprises 10 tropical
countries, now defined as ASEAN1 with a total population of around 500 million. For
more than a decade, these countries displayed impressive growth rates and increases in
per capita income, along with rapid industrialization. Singapore is characterized as
being in the first wave of Asian NIEs.2 Since the mid-1980s, the regional pattern of
trade and investment has been evolving rapidly, with the strong growth of manufactured
exports, especially in the second generation of emerging economies. These include the
other three ASEAN countries: Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. By the first half of the
1990s the process extended itself to the Philippines, and even the transitional economy
of Vietnam. The road towards such an export-oriented requires countries to
continuously adapt to changes in comparative and competitive advantage. For example,
certain labour-intensive export industries in Malaysia and Thailand have lost
competitiveness and have relocated to other economies in the region. Their industrial
structures have undergone a process of adjustment into more capital-intensive and
technologically sophisticated manufacturing sectors. These adjustments created intra-
regional flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) followed by the expansion of capital
and intermediate goods intra-firm and intra-industry trade among regional economies.
Globalization and openness are not entirely responsible for the recent Asian crisis. As a
matter of fact, the region had done relatively well out of globalization and openness in
terms of trade as well as investment inflows before the turmoil. It can be argued,
however, that financial and capital-account liberalization was too rapid because
domestic institutional capacities were inadequate and unable to cope with the influx of
capital. Capital became abundantly available for domestic-oriented activities at the
expense of the outwardly oriented trade and investment linkages built earlier. Herding
behaviour by foreign banks rushing in to invest in several economies played a major
role. The key factor was faith in the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate and the
spread on local investment, especially in construction and securities. Eventually worries
about deficits in the current account of the balance of payments appeared on the
horizon. These were earlier ignored because of capital inflows. Eventually the herding
behaviour of Western banks reversed itself and there was a pullout of funds. The fixed
exchange rate par values became untenable in the absence of even higher interest rates,
and expectations of imminent currency devaluation led to a currency crisis. These
speculative attacks finally materialized and there was substantial exchange rate
devaluation. Twinned with this were banking crises, especially in Thailand and
Indonesia. Most importantly, the East Asian crisis introduced the new phenomenon of
contagion. This involves the spread of crisis to neighbouring countries and even further
afield. Singapore was hit, even though its economic fundamentals were healthy. On the
other hand, Taiwan, another country with favourable fundamentals, managed to steer
1 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) includes its original five members of the
Bangkok Declaration of 1967 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and five
additional members (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam)
2 Asian Newly Industrialized Economies: Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan.2
clear of the crisis. Later, there were financial crisis in other ‘emerging’ markets,
including Russia in 1998 and Brazil during 1999.
The financial crisis of 1997-98 had adverse implications for the real sector and future
growth potential of these countries. It may be seen as an opportunity for the regional
economies to put their houses in order. The debate in the region is no longer focused on
whether countries should seek to integrate into the global economy. But rather the
question now relates to the appropriate terms on which that integration should take
place. ASEAN remains open, and is deepening and widening regional integration to
poorer countries in the area. There remains a question as to whether ASEAN can adapt
its past success into new internal capabilities to cope with newer features of
globalization. Crisis challenges consensus, and the recent episodes in East Asia and
elsewhere have undermined faith in the ‘Washington Consensus’ set of beliefs
regarding the benefits of liberalization, certainly as far as financial markets are
concerned (see Stiglitz 1998 for one example). The broader issues raised by the
experience of Southeast Asia pertain to lessons for other countries, and this in turn
centres on the fundamental question: has globalization and liberalization gone too far?3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1 examines ASEAN economies in
a globalized context, section 2 the ASEAN experience of liberalization and also the
impact of the crisis, and finally section 3 looks at crisis management and attempts to
enumerate lessons for the rest of the developing world.
1 Open ASEAN economies in the context of globalization
According to Fukasaku (1992) the developments in the trade and growth patterns for
East Asia as a whole reflected a ‘flying geese’ pattern. In other words, it involved
lagging economies catching up with more advanced ones. First Northeast Asian nations,
South Korea and Taiwan, caught up with Japan; then others in Southeast Asia gradually
followed suit. This reflected the heterogeneity among the various economies in the
region in terms of population, per-capita incomes, natural and human resource
endowments and so on. One would normally expect a degree of inter-industry trade
between these disparate Asian economies. But there has been a vast growth of intra-
regional trade, a good deal of which is of the intra-industry variety. Several reasons
have been put forward for the growth of intra-regional and intra-firm trade. One reason
was the appreciation of the Japanese and then the Korean currencies in the wake of the
Plaza accords of 1987. This appreciation would have encouraged Japanese and Korean
firms to re-locate some of their production activities to lower cost and geographically
proximate economies in the region, giving rise to intra-Asian foreign direct investment
(FDI). Of course, FDI from other parts of the world has also flowed into the region.
North and Southeast Asian nations were among the first developing countries to
embrace globalization because of their early adoption of outward orientation. The
degree of trade openness is high, and the measure of openness (the sum of exports and
imports as a proportion of GDP) is greater than 100 per cent for the region as a whole.
Apart from Singapore, ASEAN economies were primarily resource-based when it came
3 Originally raised by Dani Rodrik (1997) in the context of groups disadvantaged by the process.3
to trade and investment before the 1980s. FDI flows into the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, The Philippines and Thailand) were largely associated with primary
production. Singapore, on the other hand, pursued an open-door policy towards FDI and
quickly embarked on export-oriented activities. By contrast, countries in the ASEAN-4
were mostly engaged in import substituting industries until the late 1970s. FDI flows
used to be mainly from Western industrialized countries.
One may summarize the present pattern of specialization and comparative advantage in
ASEAN utilizing the principle of revealed comparative advantage, due to Balassa
(1965). Indonesia's specialization is in the resource-intensive product groups
(SITC 0-4).4 During the last decade newer labour intensive manufactured products are
gaining competitive advantage, especially in SITC 6 and 8. Malaysia also specializes in
natural resource based products such as crude materials (SITC 2), mineral fuels
(SITC 3), and animal and vegetable oils (SITC 4). But after the mid-1980s, the country
moved on to a number of capital and technology intensive manufactured exports (SITC
75-77). The Philippines has more recently began exporting labour-intensive
manufactures (in SITC 8 and 9), and a few capital and technology intensive items
(SITC 76-77). A large share of Singapore's total exports consists of re-exports (APEC
Secretariat, 1999), and this share has remained comparatively stable over time.
Singapore's specialization includes SITC 7; in particular technologically advanced SITC
75-77 goods. Thailand grew rapidly during the regional economic boom that started in
the mid-1980s. Apart from its comparative advantage in some resource-intensive sectors
in SITC 0 and SITC 2, Thailand had also specialized in labour-intensive industries
(SITC 8), and more recently in some technology-intensive industries (SITC 75-77).
These findings are also confirmed in Murshed (1999).
As for investment flows, the region registered a rapid increase in inflows from an
annual average of US$ 3.1 billion between 1982-87, to almost US$ 28 billion in 1997;
equivalent to around one eighth of FDI inflows to all developing economies (UNCTAD,
World Investment Reports). Also, between 1980 and 1997, the stock of inward FDI as a
proportion of ASEAN output rose from around 16 per cent to over 37 per cent (see
Table 1). This is greater than the world average, which rose from under 5 per cent to
more than 10 per cent, over the period 1980-1996; see Nayyar (2000). FDI inflows as a
proportion of 6 ASEAN countries' gross fixed capital formation rose rapidly from 6.9
per cent between 1980-84 to 15.9 per cent in 1996 (Table 2). This also represents a
higher figure than the world average, which rose from 2 per cent in 1980 to 6 per cent in
1996. Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia ranked among the top 10 developing countries
to benefit from such flows.
The post-1980 flows of FDI have been directed to export-oriented manufacturing, and
hence changed the pattern of trade in ASEAN-4. By the early 1990s, foreign firms
accounted for more than half the manufactured exports from the Philippines and
Thailand and over 80 per cent from Singapore and Malaysia (Dowling 1994; Lim and
Pang 1991). It has also encouraged intra-regional flows of investment in recent years
towards Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Evidence shows that flows of FDI into
ASEAN has played a significant role in developing world class manufacturing, resulting
4 SITC stands for Standard International Trade Classification. Sections 5-8 cover manufactures. The
most technologically advanced manufactures fall within SITC 7, and labour intensive manufactures
usually fall within 6 and 8. See Murshed (1999) and Fukasaku (1992) for details.4
in knowledge transfer and the industrial modernization of these countries. This has been
evident most for electronics but also the automobile industry. Some other industries like
steel and petrochemical industries could join this bandwagon in the near future.
Table 1
Inward and Outward FDI Stocks in ASEAN
As a percentage of GDP, 1980-1998












































































































































































Inward FDI stock in
ASEAN-6
15.9 23.4 26.4 27.6 29.1 34.7 37.1 51.4
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (various years), Geneva.
(-) indicates that the item is equal to zero or its values are negligible.
n.a. means non available data5
Table 2
FDI Inflows into selected countries as a percentage of Gross Domestic Capital Formation
(GDFC), 1980-1998































ASEAN-5 6.9 8.7 12.0 11.9





































8.4 12.1 14.1 14.9 15.9 14.6
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (various years), Geneva.
Average from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
A remarkable development in intra-regional trade in ASEAN is the rapid expansion of
investment in cross-border production operations and the network in vertically
integrated industries, particularly in electronics and motor vehicles, by US and Japanese
multi-national companies (MNCs), and more recently by MNCs from Asian NIEs. As
shown by Petri (1994), growth, trade and FDI in the region have reinforced each other
to make the region known for its ‘trade-investment nexus’. The formation of the
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) will increase FDI flows and trade in the region
(Athukorala and Menon 1997). These interlinkages are important as trade policy affects
FDI flows, and FDI policies affect trade flows via intra-firm trade.
An APEC (1999) study focussed on how trade might influence growth. For Thailand
openness did not necessarily raise total factor productivity (TFP), rather a more open
economy stimulated faster capital accumulation, see Young (1994, 1995). Singapore has
a huge central provident fund. Investment is therefore influenced more by the
mandatory saving rate rather than by international trade. In the Philippines there were6
distortion creating trade and investment policies. In Indonesia openness in trade raised
both investment and TFP.
2 Asean responses to globalization through economic liberalization
2.1 Trade liberalization and regional integration
ASEAN countries had conducted a series of structural adjustments in domestic policy
through liberalization and deregulation. Deregulation began with trade. An observable
trend of liberalizing investment regimes followed suit.
The liberalization moves were further intensified with the advent of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA). The original AFTA schedule called for tariffs to be reduced to 0-5
per cent within 15 years and non-tariff barriers to be eliminated within 8 years
beginning 1 January 1993. In 1994, this timetable was brought forward so that the fast
track reduction would be completed by 2000, and the normal track by 2003. Thus most
intra-ASEAN trade, except for new members, will have a maximum of 5 per cent
import duty by 2003. The AFTA tariff cuts are linked to the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) formula, based on sectors, and hence has very
comprehensive product coverage. It is estimated that by 2000 tariffs would be down to
0-5 per cent for at least 90 per cent of tariff lines. Although there is a time lag allowed
for newer members, the schedule has been accelerated for them also. This means that,
for the six older ASEAN members, AFTA should be substantially completed by 2000.
In order to bring down barriers to trade in services, members have made commitments
to liberalize seven service sectors: air transport, business services, construction,
financial services, maritime transport, telecommunications and tourism.
There are still some contentious issues in AFTA implementation, although the region's
leaders have revealed themselves to be committed to AFTA. The tariff elimination by
2003 may not fully be realized as some members may delay their efforts. The car
industry is a case in point, where import tariffs on cars and car parts are scheduled to be
subject to a ceiling of 5 per cent. Thailand seems on schedule with regard to its tariff
cuts. The country looks as though it would gain from a liberalized trading environment
with an emerging status as a car-production hub in the region.5 Malaysia, on the other
hand, is seeking to delay its tariff liberalization. Its national carmakers like Proton and
Perodua, seem unprepared to withstand the increased competition that would result.6
Japanese car makers are likely to cut into the domestic share of these car makers so they
are unlikely to make gains in export markets such as Indonesia and the Philippines,
where the Japanese are better positioned. For the moment, there is a danger that AFTA
will end up producing only a series of interim deals, including bilateral tariff agreements
5 Bangkok Post, 2 May 2000.
6 Malaysia decided to protect its car industry from November 1999 irritating Thailand which has
threatened to protect its palm oil industry from Malaysia imports, Legawie, Jochen (2000) Far
Eastern Economic Review,M a y ,p .3 2 .7
and quotas. This means that ASEAN needs to deepen its own regional integration but
make it effective in implementation.
The small size of intra-regional trade as a proportion of total trade suggests that an
inward-looking, European Union style, economic grouping is not desirable. In the short-
run, the crisis had reduced purchasing power in member countries diminishing intra-
regional trade and investment. Once confidence in the region is restored, intra-regional
activities should recover. With the presence of MNCs in the region and the volume of
intra-firm trade thus generated, a significant part of intra-ASEAN trade is guaranteed.
2.2 Liberalization of investment regimes
Investment regimes are an important component of economic policy and strategy within
the ASEAN region. The present reality is quite different from period before the mid-
1980s, when ASEAN countries still showed marked differences in policies and attitudes
towards FDI (Chia 1998). After the mid-1980s, other governments embarked on
unilateral liberalization, deregulation and privatization, resulting in a more open regime
that promoted manufacturing for export. Singapore had always maintained a very open
economy with free capital flows. This later spread to the ASEAN-4, where governments
pursued a more active policy, using investment incentives and investment promotion
policies to attract foreign investors. The exception was the Philippines where political
uncertainties prevailed.
Most ASEAN countries provide investment incentives to attract and control FDI. They
include tax holidays, accelerated depreciation and investment allowances, export
incentives, preferential loans, and subsidies. These incentives are often offered in
conjunction with performance requirements. Competition for FDI, however, has
resulted in incentives being shifted from local firms to MNCs. There was an eventual
convergence of FDI policies with regard to both the level and range of investment
incentives offered, and the relaxation of performance requirements and other restrictive
regulations (Chia 1997; Konan 1996). The convergence of FDI policies has meant that
host countries have paid greater attention to other factors that maintain or secure a
competitive edge. But it also raises questions about the extent to which ASEAN
governments compete for investment amongst each other. With the recent crisis, many
countries have become even more FDI dependent.
Full repatriation of profits is allowed for most investments in almost all ASEAN
countries. Fiscal investment incentives are broadly similar within the region.
Administration of FDI has been streamlined towards more efficient investment approval
procedures and a greater transparency and consistency in applying investment
incentives and performance requirements. The liberalizing trend is towards a clear
national treatment in policy formulation for both foreign and domestic investors. A
favourable investment environment exists in terms of access to land and infrastructural
facilities. Most countries, however, restrict foreign equity participation in some areas.
For these and other reasons several countries in the region have entered into bilateral
investment agreements with a growing number of FDI home countries. Such agreements
usually have the scope for right of establishment and national treatment, rights to
repatriate capital and income without restriction, assurances that expropriation of8
foreign-own assets is allowable only under well-defined conditions with fair and prompt
compensation, and avoidance of double taxation.
When some governments, especially Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand,
embarked on export-oriented industrialization, the direction and emphasis of investment
policies changed to promote exports. The agencies promoting investment had
encouraged domestic and foreign investors to exploit incentives offered for investment.7
Several countries in ASEAN had notified the WTO of their local content and/or trade
balancing programmes under the 1998 trade-related investment measures (TRIMs)
agreement.8 As a consequence many ASEAN countries are able to maintain local
content requirements as well as trade balancing stipulations and the 100 per cent export
requirement of export processing zones, both of which are forms of export promotion.
In almost all ASEAN countries the direction of industrial policy has been shaped and set
by trade and investment policies. As most of them are outwardly oriented, the
industrialization that has taken place is influenced by the external contact each country
has had with foreign countries. For Malaysia and Indonesia, industrial policy can be
characterized by a big-push and government intervention to stimulate industrial growth;
the emphasis towards measures that deal directly with increasing efficiency and
competition are less evident. The manner in which trade patterns impact on industrial
policy can be seen in a changing global trading environment. Malaysia and Thailand, as
indicated above, are losing competitive advantage in labour-intensive activities and
have to shift to a second-stage of export-oriented industrialization based on the export
of technology and knowledge-intensive products like Singapore. Such a transformation
will require a consistent industrial policy based on targeting some industries with R&D
capacities and an adequate pool of skilled workers with support from public and private
infrastructure.
The Southeast Asian corporate culture and governance mechanisms have come under
increased scrutiny since the onset of the recent crisis. Government and business
relations give privileges to big conglomerates in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand.9
The limited progress in dismantling these kinds of government business relations
diminishes the Southeast Asian ability to enforce new policies, and also leads to the
erosion of the strength of the region's business management.
2.3 Liberalization of capital-account transactions and the 1997-98 crisis
In most ASEAN countries, exchange rate stability was part of government policy. The
choice of exchange rate regime and the degree of financial openness are crucial for the
rest of the economy. However, these countries chose mainly to fix their exchange rates
7 Malaysian investment policies including two principal acts-the Promotion of Investment Act (1986)
and the Income Tax Act (1967). Thailand's Investment Promotion Act was applied back in 1977.
8 Including Indonesia (selected products), Malaysia (automotive industry) and Thailand (selected
products). See UNCTAD (1999).
9 Many big financial and industrial conglomerates in Malaysia are under the protection of the Prime
Minister Mahathir, including his own project of Supercorridor Multimedia. Indonesian authorities,
during the Suharto era, routinely dispensed favours to his family and friends.9
while capital controls had been relaxed or liberalized allowing international interest rate
arbitrage flows to complicate the sustainability of domestic policies.
Positive factors such as high growth rates, relative currency stability and substantial
interest rate differentials, all contributed to attracting international lenders after capital
account liberalization. Following the rapid liberalization of domestic financial sectors
the form of bank lending altered from lending by individual banks to syndicated bank
loans (World Bank 1999), and from sovereign bonds to portfolio flows and back to bank
lending (UNCTAD 1998). Krugman (1999) points out that their was a revival in private
capital flows to developing countries after 1990, rising from US$ 42 billion to a pre-
crisis level of US$ 256 billion in 1997. Most of this went to selected Latin American
economies and East Asian countries. Eventually, these large capital inflows led to rapid
credit expansion in the context of a liberalized financial sector, without adequate
prudential regulation.
One could have argued that the pre-crisis opening to international capital markets would
quickly eliminate most of the visible imperfections of domestic financial institutions.
Unfortunately, this proved to be an overly simplistic view. This is because financial
liberalization requires effective prudential regulation and supervision to ensure the
safety and soundness of the financial system. This had not been followed. Financial
liberalization had not encouraged domestic financial reforms and corporate governance.
A sharp increase in capital inflows in to the region since the early 1990s was mainly in
the form of short-term lending to both banks and firms. This lending was supposed to
finance investment with a capacity to generate export earnings. Just before the crisis
became obvious, total lending for ASEAN was quite substantial both for banks and the
non-bank private sector (Table 3) with negligible sovereign borrowing. In contrast to
the Asian NIEs, the ASEAN-4 had borrowed more from the foreign non-bank private
sector. Much of this lending was on short maturity (Table 3, column 1, figures in
parenthesis). The increasing size of these capital flows consisted of short-term arbitrage
funds seeking to profit from the interest rate differentials, rather than funds seeking
long-term returns on productive investment. There were strong herding tendencies.
Table 3















































Source: UNCTAD (1998), Trade and Development Report, Geneva, p. 60. Figures in parenthesis indicate10
the percentage of loans with a maturity of less than 1 year.
The high growth era in East Asia drove firms to expand capacity, which increased the
ratio of investment to GDP from already high levels (Table 4), facilitated by the
availability of relatively low-cost foreign funding. This capacity expansion occurred at
the time when growth rates in the region started to decelerate. The return on equity in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand between 1992 and 1996 fell below domestic short-
term interest rates. Apart from the over capacity in manufacturing production,
construction and property also contributed to the crisis. Real estate loans reached a high
of between 25-40 per cent of bank lending in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines in
1998 funded to a large extent by short-term foreign borrowing (Chirathivat 1999).
These sharp increases in property prices, together with rising equity prices of property
development companies, led to speculation in the stock market. The expected increases
in asset prices put banks and property businesses in an extremely vulnerable position
before the crisis.
There were other problems too. For example, the Malaysian National Economic
Recovery Plan following the crisis highlights the sharp fall in productivity growth from
the high level in the late 1980s. Investment was more than two-fifths of Malaysian GDP
between 1995 and 1997, with a limited increase in output because of the large share of
the property sector and other capital intensive projects with expected long-run returns
(Mody 1999). Then there were the current account deficits. The decline of ASEAN
competitiveness in trade was caused by the adverse movements in the dollar-yen rate,
together with an adjustment of the Chinese remmenbi currency, which posed a direct
threat to the exports of ASEAN countries. Loss of export earnings continued, and as the
situation turned from bad to worse, banks and firms were left with increasing foreign
exchange risk exposures.
Table 4
























Source: UNCTAD (1998), Trade and Development Report, Geneva, p. 6111
3 Crisis, its aftermath and lessons for other developing countries
3.1 Crisis management in ASEAN
A great deal has been written about the economic and financial crisis in the region. It is
mainly argued that the vulnerability was created by fixed exchange rates, along with
capital account and financial sector liberalization in the presence of a bank-based
financial regime with an implicit promise of a bail out. The collapse was due to the fact
that currency depreciation led to a worsening of the financial crisis due to massive
unhedged borrowing in foreign currency. This in turn triggered fears of sovereign
insolvency, which turned capital outflows into a currency collapse (World Bank 1999).
Each country's policy response was tailored to domestic political considerations.
Malaysia opted for a fixed exchange rate along with capital controls in September 1998.
Thailand floated after July 1997, and the Baht fluctuated before finding its new level
against major currencies. Indonesia considered a currency board, then abandoned this
idea and allowed the rupiah to float. Vietnam, on the other hand, chose to devalue its
currency and adopted a fixed exchange rate. The manner in which each ASEAN country
selected its currency regime right after the crisis was very much in response to cross-
border capital movements. The role of central bank policy intervention was crucial and
in Malaysia capital controls were implemented to deter currency speculators. The
country was reluctant to accept the IMF prescription, as this was at variance with
national economic policy objectives. Its foreign debt exposure was rather more limited
than in Thailand and Indonesia (Ariff and Abubakar 1999), and this helped to fend off
the IMF.
Capital mobility and capital controls such as those implemented in Chile in 1991 and
Malaysia in 1998 have been discussed extensively in the wake of the Asian crisis
(Edwards 1999). Malaysia's capital controls were wide-ranging. Some of these measures
included the forced liquidation of offshore ringgit accounts by residents and non-
residents, a ban on the provision of credit facilities to non-residents, and the one-year
holding period requirement prior to the sale of Malaysian securities. These capital
controls were relaxed in early February 1999 when the strictly back-in rule was replaced
by a kind of capital gains tax. Foreign funds are subject to a withdrawal tax on a sliding
scale. However, a different system applies for investments entering the country after
mid-February 1999. The benefits of capital controls must be weighed against the costs.
The major cost involves the country's credibility because it is viewed as a departure
from the usual rules of the game. Other costs include the usual rent seeking and other
unproductive activities associated with such a policy, Rajan (1998). It remains to be
seen whether the time gained due to capital controls will be exploited to implement the
required structural policy reforms. If there is a tendency towards complacency induced
by a temporary recovery, it may delay required policy reforms.
In Thailand and Indonesia interest rates were raised sharply in order to restore stability
to foreign exchange markets. The inflows of official financing from the IMF helped to
limit the extent of further currency depreciation. Once confidence was restored interest
rates were reduced. The decline in GDP and substantial exchange rate depreciation
helped to bring about trade and current account surpluses in all ASEAN economies
except Singapore.12
Since 1999, however, there has been a degree of economic recovery in East Asia.
Thailand and Indonesia adopted the IMF package of reforms. Thailand is due to grow at
a rate of 4 per cent in 2000 and 2001, and Indonesia is expected to achieve growth rates
of 3 per cent in 2000 and 3.5 per cent in 2001.10 Malaysia, with its unique approach to
problem solving and its rejection of the IMF prescriptions, seems to be growing well
with forecast of at least 4 per cent growth in 2000 and 2001. Singapore, least hit by the
crisis, posted growth of 5.4 per cent in 1999 and that pace is expected to rise to 5.9 per
cent in 2000 and 6 per cent in 2001.
Post-crisis foreign direct investment has become mainly involved in mergers and
acquisitions for all sorts of business including banking, real estate, retailing and
manufacturing takeovers. The crisis paradoxically encouraged new opportunities for
investment, and these could continue to be present as long as the region is open and
improves its investment environment for foreign investors. The crisis will reverse the
income effect driving intra-regional trade and investment. Malaysia, Thailand and
Indonesia, for example, have had to cut back their investment outflows to the region.
This, however, is likely to be temporary.
3.2 Post-crisis policy implications
First and foremost, the crisis produced a collapse in living standards. In 1998, per capita
GDP fell 57 per cent in Indonesia, 29 per cent in Malaysia, 26 per cent in Thailand and
22 per cent in the Philippines. In 1999, income per capita recovered 48 per cent in
Indonesia, 9 per cent in Malaysia, 14 per cent in the Philippines and 11 per cent in
Thailand. These figures raise the question about the public provision of social safety
networks for those hardest hit by the crisis.
Secondly, the crisis highlighted the need for comprehensive financial sector reform and
prudential regulation in this area. Prior to the crisis there was rapid financial sector
liberalization in Indonesia and Thailand, causing the number of financial institutions to
mushroom. These institutions borrowed short from foreign banks in dollars and lent
long to domestic borrowers. This process has been described as ‘mismatch funding’. As
indicated earlier, a lot of these loans were used to finance construction and the purchase
of securities. After the onset of the crisis in July 1997 there was a good deal of debt
default related to non-performing loans, especially in Indonesia and Thailand. This
suggests the presence of moral hazard, a familiar refrain raised after every financial
crisis. In other words, there is an implicit guarantee of government rescue if the
financial sector runs into serious difficulties. The moral hazard problem is even greater
when informal social networks operate to the extent that the owners or managers of
financial institutions are close to the government. Furthermore, it would be unfair to
ignore the moral hazard that exists in the Western banking system who are protected by
implicit and explicit guarantees from national and international financial institutions
(IMF). Herding behaviour11 on the part of Western banks, who kept on increasing their
exposure in East Asia, despite the fundamentals, played no small part in engendering
10 These and other GDP growth forecasts are based on the IMF World Economic Outlook, 2000.
11 This implies a justification of reckless behaviour based on safety in numbers. Thus, if everyone
behaves recklessly the probability of serious punishment is low.13
the crisis. Issues pertaining to prudential regulation and banking/currency crises are
examined in Murshed and Subagjo (2000).
Thirdly, there are macroeconomic policy issues. These include concerns about the
appropriate exchange rate regime. Flexible exchange rates in developing countries are
deemed inappropriate, as they do not exhibit a sufficient anti-inflation commitment,
thereby deterring inward investment. Fixed exchange rates run the risk of becoming
incompatible with the macroeconomic environment, which in turn induces a currency
crisis. The matter of the appropriate exchange rate regime is, therefore, an unresolved
issue. Another macroeconomic issue concerns fiscal policy. Unlike during the Latin
American debt crisis of the 1980s, the countries affected by the East Asian crisis did not
have unsustainable deficits, nor was there problematic lending to the state. Therefore,
expansionary fiscal policy could have been used to lessen the negative output impact of
the crisis. But this would have been an anathema to the IMF. Also there are dangers
associated with high interest rates used to prop up exchange rates after a currency crisis.
These higher interest rates have harmful effects at a time when the economy is already
in recession (Stiglitz 1998).
Fourthly, there are matters related to institutional capacity. The discussion above
regarding imperfectly functioning financial institutions highlighted this inadequacy in
the government and its associated agencies. In addition, the state is intimately linked to
the private sector via powerful and resilient informal social networks. This makes
solutions to moral hazard and adverse selection problems in policy formulation all the
more difficult to achieve. A related matter concerns infrastructural bottlenecks. In
Indonesia and Thailand, for example, there were several bottlenecks in the delivery of
infrastructural services because of the corruption of politicians and bureaucrats.
Finally, the role of proposed regional institutions such as an AMF (Asian Monetary
Fund) aimed at preventing and lessening the impact of future financial crises in the
region. This would avoid the need to necessarily seek assistance from the IMF. It took
quite some time before Asian countries discussing this proposal were even able to agree
on a common framework, and the feeble response of Japan, the only country in Asia
with real economic power, effectively sealed the fate of this idea.
3.3 Lessons for other developing economies
Southeast Asia has come to be regarded as the model for development. This is in sharp
contrast to a generation ago when there was considerable pessimism regarding its
potential (Myrdal 1968). The most marginalized region of the developing world at
present is sub-Saharan Africa. A variety of explanations, some to do with tropical
location (Bloom and Sachs 1998), have been forwarded.12 According to this view,
tropical Asia is in a more favourable position. Other reasons for the problems in Africa
are said to be its high, and potentially conflict producing, ethno-linguistic diversity.
12 Tropical Africa is meant to be disadvantaged by lower agricultural productivity, a higher disease
burden and greater distance from the sea than any other region of the world.14
Another argument put forward for the lack of development in general, and the absence
of industrialization in particular, is substantial natural resource endowment (for
example, Auty and Gelb 2000). A high bounty from nature, and the reliance on exports
of such products, is said to make an economy inefficient, inward looking, less adaptable
to change, and corrupt due to the scramble for natural resource rents. Also when the
resources are more concentrated (point sourced as in the case of minerals) it makes for
greater income inequality, autocracy and low levels of human capital accumulation, all
of which impact negatively on growth. Also, concentrated natural resource rents can
produce civil conflict, which is often a struggle for the control of these revenues
(Addison et al. 2000). It has been argued, that Northeast Asia, in particular, was blessed
with propitious circumstances for growth and the drive towards industrialization: low
natural resource endowments, and an egalitarian income distribution. It has to be
pointed out that several countries in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia
are resource rich. But they overcame the problems associated with resource abundance,
including a timely departure from policies associated with import substituting
industrialization, and the broad resolution of ethnic conflict (except Indonesia). Policy,
therefore, can make all the difference. Many African and several Latin American
economies can be cited as examples of resource abundant economies where policy error
has persisted and conflicts have not ceased. So the most important broad policy lesson
from successful parts of East Asia is to be open and adaptable to the changing pattern of
the world economy, as well as achieve a lasting resolution to domestic conflict.
One of the more specific lessons from the experience of Southeast Asia concerns FDI.
Very few developing countries receive meaningful quantities of FDI inflows. Yet it is
central to their avowed development policy goals. The experience of Southeast Asia
suggests that piecemeal measures, such as the odd tax concession to attract FDI are not
good enough. Countries will be judged in terms of the overall climate for investment,
which include infrastructure and institutional quality. A genuine commitment to open
trade and investment regimes is a pre-condition for success. Clamouring for special and
differential treatment in trade can be counterproductive and convey the wrong signal.
Southeast Asia also demonstrates that there might be contagion effects in FDI. A
country's location in a thriving (or declining) region can determine success in attracting
investment.
A second specific policy lesson concerns bank regulation. Prudential regulation is
important for even the poorest and small economies. One reason is the prevalence of
non-performing loans that can be avoided through prudential regulation. Also, capital
flight (outflows) following a currency crisis can occur in small and vulnerable
economies even where capital inflows are insignificant. Prudential regulation is only
coherent when sound macroeconomic policies regarding inflation and exchange rates
are being pursued. In other words, sound macroeconomic policies and prudential bank
regulation are complements.
The East Asian crisis brought out the phenomenon of financial contagion. It further
called into question the Washington consensus, or at least its naive version. Blind faith
in the efficacy of markets is no longer accepted at least when it comes to capital account
and financial sector liberalization. A more cautious approach to liberalization is now
fashionable. This should not, however, be used as an excuse to postpone reform or to
strengthen the power of rent seeking groups seeking protection and special treatment.
Policy makers are now more cautious about the wider (general equilibrium) effects of
policy reforms.15
Good institutions and institutional capacity relate to all the factors mentioned above.
Attempts to reform institutions are fraught with difficulties, not least because of the
opportunism associated with political processes.
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